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iii. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * Case No. 20000280-CA 
VS. * 
* 
DON BROKMEYER, 
Defendant/Appellant * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure because the entry of the judgment on March 20, 
2000 is considered to be the final decision of the District Court. See also Utah 
Code §78-2a-3 (2) (e). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 2000, within 30 days of the 
entry of judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
The issue presented for review is whether the district court erred in denying 
Mr. Brokmeyer's suppression motion [R. 9-13]. Legal determinations regarding 
reasonable suspicion made by the trial court are to be broadly reviewed for 
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correctness, with the Appellate Court affording a measure of discretion to the trial 
court in the application of the correctness standard. State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 
446 (Utah 1996); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). The factual 
findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Friesen. 988 
P.2d 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable case supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
Warrants shall issue but upon probable case supported 
by Oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Mr. Brokmeyer appeals from his conviction following the entry of his 
conditional pleas of guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8 and Expired Registration, a 
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Class "C" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 41-1a-1303. Specifically, Mr. 
Brokmeyer challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
1. On January 19, 2000, Mr. Brokmeyer was charged in a one-count 
Information with Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8 [R. 1]. The Information was later amended to 
include two additional counts: No Insurance, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code § 41-12a-302, and Expired Registration, a Class "C" 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 41-1 a-1303 [R. 7-8]. 
2. On February 17, 2000, both the preliminary hearing and Mr. 
Brokmeyer's hearing on his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. The 
suppression motion was denied that same day [R. 28]. 
3. On March 17, 2000, the trial court entered Mr. Brokmeyer's 
conditional pleas of guilty to unlawful possession and expired registration. State 
v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)[R. 28]. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
The sentencing was held on March 20, 2000 [R. 22-23]. At that time, the 
trial court sentenced Mr. Brokmeyer to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison 
and imposed a fine in the amount of one thousand five-hundred eighty-seven 
dollars ($1,587.00) [R. 22-23]. The trial court stayed execution of the prison 
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sentence and placed Mr. Brokmeyer on informal probation to the court for twenty-
four (24) months on the conditions that he pay the fine and he violate no Federal, 
State or Municipal laws [R. 22-23]. The Notice of Appeal was filed timely on 
March 31, 2000 [R. 25-26]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet, dated January 14, 2000, and attested 
to by the arresting officer, Deputy Glenn Begay, on January 14, 2000, at 6:21 
p.m., Mr. Brokmeyer's vehicle was stopped for no license plate lights [R. 28, pg. 
24]. Mr. Brokmeyer's companion, Ms. Manelly, was driving the vehicle [R. 28, pg. 
8-9]. Upon approaching the vehicle, Deputy Begay saw marijuana seeds on the 
driver's floorboard [R. 28, pg. 8-9]. Deputy Begay asked Mr. Brokmeyer if there 
were any other controlled substances present [R. 28, pg. 16]. Mr. Brokmeyer 
stated that he had psilocybin in his jacket pocket [R. 28, pg. 16]. Mr. Brokmeyer 
was arrested [R. 28, pg. 20]. 
At the preliminary hearing1, Deputy Begay added that after seeing the 
marijuana seeds on the floorboard, he noticed a small package of psilocybin in 
the ashtray [R. 28, pg. 9]. Deputy Begay further testified that while possession of 
marijuana seeds was, in and of itself, a criminal act he did not seize the seeds [R. 
28 pg. 38]. Deputy Begay did not cite Mr. Brokmeyer or Ms. Manelly for 
The testimony at the preliminary hearing was used for the suppression 
motion [R. 28, pg. 22]. 
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possession of the marijuana seeds, rather, he released the vehicle and the 
marijuana seeds to Ms. Manelly [R. 28, pg. 38]. 
With respect to identifying either substance, Deputy Begay was unable to 
provide much information other than he had seen both illicit substances during his 
training. When he was asked to describe marijuana with some detail, his 
response was that the substance would "look like marijuana' or that "it had a look 
of its own." [R. 28, pg. 25-28]. The deputy was unable to testify how marijuana 
was ingested. [R. 28, pg. 27]. With respect to marijuana seeds, the deputy 
testified as follows: 
Q. And what do seeds look like? 
A. They look like marijuana seeds. 
Q. Okay. And can you give me a little bit more of a 
description in terms of color, size, weight? 
A. They're small. 
Q. How small? 
A. Urn, I don't know what —how much of a 
dimension of small you want, or — 
Q. Give me another thing that is comparable to it. Is 
it like a poppy seed? Like a tomato seed? What 
is it like? 
A. It's like a marijuana seed. 
Q. But you can't give me any more of a description 
than that? 
A. It's got a look of it's own. 
Q. And has [sic] that look? 
A. A marijuana seed. 
Q. And you can't describe to me any distinct coloring. 
You can't describe to me any distinct size, 
shape, anything-anything distinct about 
marijuana? 
A. No. 
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[R. 28, pg. 29]. 
The deputy's description of psilocybin was equally lacking: it was "dried" 
as opposed to "fluid" and that it looked "like the quarter portion of a mushroom on 
the top part of it" [R. 28, pg. 12-13]. 
The deputy testified that he received training to include all of the important 
and significant facts in his arrest reports [R. 28, pg. 33]. He testified that he was 
also taught to be thorough in his reports [R. 28, pg. 34]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is well established that a detention is constitutionally permissible only 
where (1) the officer's action was reasonably justified at its inception and (2) "the 
resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first place." State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-
32 (Utah 1994)(quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 
LEd.2d 889 (1968). 
Deputy Begay's stop of the vehicle due to a minor equipment was 
constitutionally permissible. The 'resulting detention' was not 'reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place'. 
The deputy initially justifies expanding the stop on the basis that he saw 
marijuana seeds. Yet, he was unable to describe a marijuana seed. In addition, 
although the deputy concedes that possession of the seeds is illegal, he allows 
the driver to continue on her way with the seeds in her possession. 
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In his initial report, the deputy indicated that when he asked about 
additional controlled substances, Mr. Brokmeyer admitted possessing psilocybin. 
There was absolutely no indication that the deputy saw the psilocybin prior to 
expanding the scope. When the deputy testified, however, he justified his actions 
based, in part, on the psilocybin in the ashtray. Similar to the marijuana seeds, 
he was unable to give much of a description of the psilocybin. Thus, under the 
circumstances, the trial court erred in finding the scope of the stop justified. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
A. WITHOUT CORROBORATION OF DEPUTY BEGAY'S CLAIM THAT HE 
SAW MARIJUANA SEEDS. THE SEARCH SHOULD BE HELD INVALID. 
In Utah v. Mavcock. 947 P.2d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court 
addressed the issue of corroboration. There, the officer justified expanding the 
stop based on the smell of burnt marijuana. No marijuana was found during the 
search. This Court held that a search based on an officer's purely subjective 
belief that there was an odor of burnt marijuana must be corroborated by finding 
evidence of either the substance or its use. 
Here, while the trial court did address the Maycock case, it failed to take 
into account the reasoning underlying the holding. Instead, the trial court simply 
concluded that Maycock was inapplicable because it dealt with the issue of smell 
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as opposed to sight. 
The trial court essentially relied on the 'plain view' doctrine. See 
generally. State v. Romero. 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983)(setting forth a three-
prong test for the plain view exception: (1) lawful presence of the trooper; (2) 
evidence in plain view and (3) clearly incriminating). Such reliance is misplaced 
given Deputy Begay was unable to specifically describe a marijuana seed. 
Moreover, the trial court failed to take into account the reasoning underlying 
the decision of Mavcock: 
If this were a case of an alert by a trained drug sniffing 
dog with a good record, we would not require 
corroboration to establish probable cause. The dog 
would have no reason to make a false alert. But for a 
human sniffer, an officer with an incentive to find 
evidence of illegal activities and to justify his actions 
when he searched without consent, we believe 
constitutional rights are endangered if limitations are not 
imposed. 
id. citing. States v. Nielsen. 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993)(emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, the deputy, by virtue of being a law enforcement 
officer, has an incentive to find evidence of illegal activities. That he was later 
unable to describe a marijuana seed shows that his initial identification is little 
more than a hunch. That his hunch turned out right makes no difference, because 
it is clear the search must be justified at its inception. 
That an assumption is insufficient is illustrated in the case of Friesen. 
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There, the officer assumed that under Wyoming law, a motorist was required to 
have both the front and rear license plates. Based on that assumption, the officer 
initiated a traffic stop. This Court rejected that assumption as sufficient 
justification, stating: 
To enforce the law, an officer must know what the law is 
and what it prohibits . . . The trooper in this instance did 
not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity when he stopped Friesen. The only articulable 
and specific fact known to him when he stopped Friesen 
was that Friesen's car had only a rear plate and that 
some states require vehicles to display front license 
plates. Having no specific knowledge about Wyoming's 
licensing requirements, he made the decision to stop 
Friesen only because he presumed that Friesen violated 
Wyoming's motor vehicle law, and that such a violation 
might be an indicator of other, possibly more serious, 
offenses as well. 
Id. at p.11. 
Here, Deputy Begay did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity when he questioned the Mr. Brokmeyer and his companion about 
the marijuana seeds and the presence of other controlled substances. The only 
articulable and specific fact known to him when he made the stop was that there 
was a minor equipment violation. Having no specific knowledge about marijuana 
seeds, other than they are 'small', or that they have a 'look of their own', is an 
insufficient basis for the deputy to justify expanding the scope of the stop. 
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B. DEPUTY BEGAY'S CLAIM THAT HE SAW PS1LQCYBIN SHOULD BE 
DISREGARDED. 
Shortly after the arrest, Deputy Begay filled out a No Warrant Arrest Fact 
Sheet. In that written report, he indicated that the basis for expanding the stop 
and conducting the search was the presence of marijuana seeds. He then 
questioned the occupants about other controlled substances. Mr. Brokmeyer 
replied that he possessed psilocybin. 
At the hearing, Deputy Begay testified that he saw the psilocybin in the 
ashtray before questioning the occupants about other controlled substances. This 
later justification should be rejected for a number of reasons. First, given the 
deputy's inability to specifically describe psilocybin, it stands to reason that the 
only way that he knew that the substance was psilocybin was based on Mr. 
Brokmeyer's admission. Like the marijuana seeds, it defies common sense that 
the deputy would be able to recognize the substance yet not be able to offer a 
description of it. 
In addition, the lack of any information about the psilocybin in the arrest 
report renders his later testimony suspect. Even though the deputy testified that 
he was trained to include all significant and material facts in his reports, no 
mention is made of the psilocybin until the hearing. This is little more than 
hindsight reconstruction. Friesen. supra at pg. 12(the justification must take 
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place at the time of the stop). 
It is clear that Terry and its progeny require that widening the scope of the 
stop is based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Here, the 
officer stops the vehicle for an equipment violation. There is no question that he 
was entitled to do so. The problem begins when Deputy Begay starts questioning 
the occupants about controlled substances. He impermissibly widened the scope 
of the stop. Accordingly, any evidence seized thereafter should be suppressed 
as 'fruits' of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 
83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's denial the Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 2000. 
/Respectfully submitted: 
R02A1IE REWLLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, two 
accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Office of the Attorney 
General, Appeals Division, 160 East 300 SoutrC6trT¥loor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114 this 13th day of July, 2000. / / ^ 
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